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ABSTRACT. Literature suggests that the type of context wherein a task is placed relates to
students’ performance and solution strategies. In the particular domain of logical thinking,
there is the belief that students have less difficulty reasoning in verbal than in logically
equivalent symbolic tasks. Thus far, this belief has remained relatively unexplored in the
domain of teaching and learning of mathematics, and has not been examined with respect
to students’ major field of study. In this study, we examined the performance of 95 senior
undergraduate mathematics and education majors in symbolic and verbal tasks about the
contraposition equivalence rule. The selection of two different groups of participants al-
lowed for the examination of the hypothesis that students’ major may influence the relation
between their performance in tasks about contraposition and the context (symbolic/verbal)
wherein this is placed. The selection of contraposition equivalence rule also addressed a
gap in the body of research on undergraduate students’ understanding of proof by con-
traposition. The analysis was based on written responses of all participants to specially
developed tasks and on semi-structured interviews with 11 subjects. The findings showed
different variations in the performance of each of the two groups in the two contexts. While
education majors performed significantly better in the verbal than in the symbolic tasks,
mathematics majors’ performance showed only modest variations. The results call for both
major- and context- specific considerations of students’ understanding of logical principles,
and reveal the complexity of the system of factors that influence students’ logical thinking.
KEY WORDS: contraposition equivalence rule, logic, proof, reasoning, reasoning do-
mains, undergraduate education
1. INTRODUCTION
Reasoning and proof are defining features of mathematics and, in present
day reform recommendations, are considered fundamental aspects of in-
structional programs in all grade levels (NCTM, 2000; Yackel and Hanna,
2003). Numerous studies have examined students’ reasoning skills and
understanding of proof in elementary (e.g., Ball and Bass, 2000, 2003;
Carpenter et al., 2003; Maher and Martino, 1996; Reid, 2002; Zack, 1997),
secondary (e.g., Chazan, 1993; Coe and Ruthven, 1994; Edwards, 1999;
Fischbein and Kedem, 1982; Healy and Hoyles, 2000; Hoyles and Kü-
chemann, 2002; Knuth et al., 2002; Porteous, 1990; Silver and Carpenter,
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1989; Silver et al., 2000), and undergraduate level (e.g., Gardiner and
Moreira, 1999; Harel and Sowder, 1998; Martin and Harel, 1989; Moore,
1994; Recio and Godino, 2002; Schoenfeld, 1986). Despite the abundance
of research on students’ reasoning and understanding of proof, this body
of research has tended not to focus on specific types of proof.
Some researchers studied students’ understanding of particular types
of proof, such as proof by counterexample and inductive/empirical proof
(Epp, 1998; Galbraith, 1981; Goetting, 1995; Harel and Sowder, 1998;
Morris, 2002; Porteous, 1990; Silver, 1998; Simon and Blume, 1996; Styl-
ianides et al., 2002; Szombathelyi and Szarvas, 1998), proof by contra-
diction (Epp, 1998; Goetting, 1995; Knuth, 1999; Tall, 1979), proof by
mathematical induction (Dubinsky, 1986, 1990; Fischbein et al., 1982;
Knuth, 1999; Markel, 1994; Movshovitz-Hadar, 1993), and proof by con-
traposition (Goetting, 1995), but proof by contraposition is, perhaps, the
method of proof that has attracted the least research attention thus far.
Goetting’s (1995) dissertation study about undergraduate students’ un-
derstanding of different kinds of proof was the only study we have been
able to locate that examined students’ understanding of proof by con-
traposition. Goetting conducted semi-structured interviews with 40 un-
dergraduate students; the sample consisted of 11 pre-service elementary
teachers, 16 pre-service secondary mathematics teachers, and 13 advanced
students primarily, but not exclusively, majoring in computer science, math-
ematics, or engineering. The types of proof that attracted Goetting’s atten-
tion, other than proof by contraposition, included inductive and deductive
arguments in support of generalizations, counterexamples to generaliza-
tions, and proof by contradiction. It is worth noting that the elementary
majors along with five other students were excluded from the part of the
study that investigated students’ understanding of both proof by contradic-
tion and proof by contraposition. The remaining 24 students were asked to
react to a given proof by contraposition for the following statement: “For
any integer b, if 2 is a factor of b2, then 2 is a factor of b”. Goetting notes
that only one student seemed comfortably acquainted with the contrapos-
ition equivalence rule used in the proof; this student said that she would
explain the rule to a questioning student using truth tables. Evaluating the
findings of her study with regard to proof by contraposition, Goetting notes
that many students had difficulties distinguishing proof by contraposition
from proof by contradiction. Some of these students confused what was to
be shown with what could be considered as given. Several other students
thought necessary to include in the given proof an extra argument for b
being even. Some students did not even consider proof by contraposition
as having any bearing on the specific statement that was proved with this
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particular method, and others “seemed to be wary of the validity of this
‘backwards’ argument” used in the proof (Goetting, 1995, p. 142).
The first focus of this paper is to extend what we currently know about
undergraduate students’ understanding of proof by contraposition, which
is an important method in proving universal conditionals of the form ∀ x
∈ D, if P(x) then Q(x). More precisely, we aim to explore more broadly
undergraduate students’ understanding of the contraposition equivalence
rule (p⇒q ≡ ∼q⇒∼p), which is fundamental to proof by contraposition.
The context in which contraposition equivalence rule was placed varied
among studies in the mathematics education literature. In several cases
(O’Brien et al., 1971; O’Brien, 1972, 1975) contraposition equivalence
rule was placed in verbal context – the setting of language statements
expressed in words –, while in some others (Goetting, 1995) contraposition
equivalence rule was placed in symbolic context – the setting of mathem-
atical notation1. The distinction between verbal and symbolic contexts is
hypothesized, in this study, to be critical in students’ ability to reason about
contraposition equivalence rule; the exploration of this assumption is the
second focus of this paper. The type of context wherein a task is placed
– also referred to as the reasoning domain – has been found to relate to
students’ performance and solution strategies across grade levels. A sig-
nificant body of research investigates mathematics problem solving and
reasoning across different contexts. In particular, Epp (1998) has argued
that introducing undergraduate students to logical principles via English
language statements can bring about better results than using the notation
of symbolic logic.
Morris (2002), drawing on numerous studies that examined adoles-
cents’ and adults’ logical competence in distinguishing between necessary
and indeterminate forms of argument, makes the point that there is a dis-
crepancy between performance in mathematics (symbolic, in our terms)
and other reasoning domains, such as the verbal syllogistic (verbal, in our
terms):
In several types of tasks, the majority of adolescents and adults have shown that
they can distinguish between necessary and indeterminate forms of argument
(e.g., Braine and Rumain, 1983; Markovits and Vachon, 1989; Moshman and
Franks, 1986; Scholnick and Wing, 1988; Ward and Overton, 1990) . . .. When
the content of a logical task is mathematical, however, the majority of adoles-
cents and adults appeared to fail to make this distinction (e.g., Lee and Wheeler,
1987; Martin and Harel, 1989; Morris and Sloutsky, 1998; Williams, 1979). It is
unclear what factors could account for the discrepancy between performance in
mathematics and other reasoning domains. (Morris, 2002, p. 80)
Morris suggests that adolescents and adults face more difficulties in dis-
tinguishing between necessary and indeterminate forms of argument when
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these kinds of argument are placed in symbolic rather than in verbal con-
texts. While the argument that certain kinds of logical competence are
lower in a symbolic reasoning domain than in other reasoning domains
seems plausible, it is worth noting that Morris’s statement is mostly based
on studies that are not specific to the teaching and learning of mathemat-
ics, and that have not examined their subjects’ logical competence in both
symbolic and verbal contexts. Also, the participants of these studies have
inhomogeneous characteristics; this fact imposes further constraints on any
attempt to make an argument that spans different studies. In this paper,
we claim that the possible association between reasoning domain – and
in, particular, symbolic and verbal contexts – and students’ understanding
of logical principles central to mathematical argumentation can systemat-
ically be investigated with comparison of the performances of the same
group of participants in these two contexts. The present study contributes
to this relatively unexplored domain of mathematics education research by
examining the performances of a group of undergraduate students in tasks
that involve application of the contraposition equivalence rule in both sym-
bolic and verbal contexts2. Contraposition equivalence rule is particularly
appropriate for this kind of investigation, for it is a logical operation that
can easily be examined in both verbal and symbolic contexts; this charac-
teristic of contraposition equivalence rule provided further motivation for
using it in this study.
Finally, in the present study we also hypothesize that students’ major
field of study may influence the way students’ performance is associated
with the context wherein contraposition equivalence rule is placed. This
hypothesis is grounded on the premise that different programs of study
may promote to different extents and in varying ways students’ ability to
reason in symbolic and verbal contexts. Based on this, the participants
of this study were selected to be senior students majoring in one of two
different fields – education and mathematics. Students’ major is believed
to be a possible factor influencing the relation between performance and
context, mainly due to the different learning experiences students acquire
as a result of their contact with the collegiate curriculum of their program
of study. The selection of these two groups of participants is motivated by
the presumably different emphases placed by the education and mathem-
atics collegiate curricula on symbolic and verbal reasoning domains; the
mathematics program of study is considered to promote more the former,
whereas the education is believed to promote more the latter. Despite these
different emphases, if we accept the hypothesis that logical competence
in contraposition is, in general, lower in symbolic context than in verbal
context, then both groups of participants are expected to perform better in
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reasoning about contraposition in a verbal rather than in a symbolic con-
text. In this sense, the case of mathematics majors attracts special interest,
for, as we noted earlier, it is plausible to assume that the mathematics
collegiate curriculum emphasizes more reasoning in the symbolic rather
than in the verbal context.
To sum up, the research questions we investigate in this paper span the
following themes: students’ understanding of contraposition, the relation
between students’ performance in tasks about contraposition equivalence
rule and the context (symbolic/verbal) in which this rule is placed, and the
role of students’ major (education/mathematics) in this relation. Specific-
ally, we examine the following three (interrelated) research questions:
1. What is students’ understanding of contraposition equivalence rule
(placed in both symbolic and verbal contexts)?
2. How does students’ performance in tasks about contraposition equi-
valence rule relate to the context (symbolic/verbal) wherein this rule is
placed?
3. What is the relation between students’ major (education/mathematics)
and their performance in tasks about the contraposition equivalence
rule placed in different contexts (symbolic/verbal)?
2. METHODS
2.1. Participants
The subjects are senior undergraduate students of the University of Cyprus
majoring either in mathematics or in education. The sample consists of 95
students – 70 education majors [EM] and 25 mathematics majors [MM] –
who participated in a larger study which aimed to elicit and compare the
conceptions of different types of proof held by the seniors of the Depart-
ment of Education and the Department of Mathematics. Given our focus on
students’ major as a possible factor influencing the way students’ perform-
ance is associated with the context wherein contraposition equivalence rule
is placed, we considered important to choose a sample representative of
the senior students of the two departments. The EM that participated in
the study constituted the 50% of the 2000–01 seniors of the Department of
Education; all of them were taking one particular class during the Fall 2000
semester to which they were allocated randomly. The 25 MM were all the
seniors of the Department of Mathematics in the academic year 2000–01.
It is worth noting that, with only very few exceptions, those graduating
from the Department of Education become elementary school teachers
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(grades K to 6). Most of the graduates of the Department of Mathemat-
ics eventually become secondary school teachers of mathematics (grades
7 to 12). In the public school system of the Republic of Cyprus, math-
ematics majors are the only graduates qualified to teach mathematics in
secondary schools. In this sense, the participants of this study may also be
considered prospective elementary school teachers and potential secondary
school teachers of mathematics. The two groups of students participat-
ing in the study (namely, education and mathematics majors) were not
selected, however, because of their professional aspirations (or opportun-
ities); rather, they were selected because of their different field-of-study
concentrations and the presumably different degrees of emphases these
concentrations place on verbal and symbolic reasoning domains.
Another important issue to be mentioned is that, contrary to what might
be expected by readers from other countries, the Department of Education
has been the most competitive department of the University of Cyprus to
be admitted to. Many different reasons – most notably, guaranteed teaching
positions, high salary, and fringe benefits – influence Cypriot students to
major in education and result in high admission standards (Papanastasiou
and Papanastasiou, 1997, 1998)3. The Department of Mathematics also
ranks high in the preferences of incoming students.
Finally, it should be noted that the EM at the University of Cyprus take
several mathematics courses that emphasize logical thinking and ask for
proofs. Specifically, the program of study at the Department of Educa-
tion requires that all students take the following courses relevant to math-
ematics: (a) Two courses on foundations and fundamental concepts of
mathematics4; (b) One introductory course on statistical methods and prob-
ability; and (c) One course on mathematics teaching and learning. These
courses provide a fair amount of mathematical knowledge about different
types of proof (including proof by contraposition) that allowed us to in-
clude this group of students in our study. The MM at the University of
Cyprus are not required to take any courses in the teaching and learning of
mathematics; their preparation focuses primarily on mathematical content
and abstract thinking.
2.2. Data and procedure
All 95 participants responded to a specially designed test that included
items on different types of proof, such as empirical/inductive proof, proof
by counterexample, proof by contradiction, proof by mathematical induc-
tion, and proof by contraposition. The data from the test were supplemen-
ted by interviews with 11 subjects, eight education and three mathematics
majors.
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TABLE I
Description of the three test items
Test Item Description
Question 1 Consider the following statement:
If x2 =y2 then x=y (where x, y ∈ N).
Study carefully the following proof for the above statement.
Proof:
If x=y ⇒ x2= y2
Hence, the statement is true.
Choose the best response for the above proof:
1. The proof is false.
2. The proof shows that the statement is always true.
3. The proof shows that the statement is true in some cases.
4. I have no opinion.
Questions 2
and 3
Study the statements and the conclusion that follows them. Circle the
response that represents better what you think about each conclusion,
and explain your thinking.
Question 2 Question 3
Statements:
• If Costas suffered from pneu-
monia, he would have high fever.
• Costas does not have high fever.
Conclusion:
Costas definitely does not suffer
from pneumonia.
Statements:
• If the car doesn’t have fuel, it
will not move.
• The car has fuel.
Conclusion:
The car will definitely move.
1. The conclusion is correct.
2. The conclusion is wrong.
3. I do not have enough clues to
decide.
1. The conclusion is correct.
2. The conclusion is wrong.
3. I do not have enough clues to
decide.
Table I shows the three test items that we report on in this study5. The
first item (Q1) included a simple proof by contraposition, the validity of
which was to be judged by the students (the proof was correct, so the right
answer was choice ‘2’). The item was designed so that the proof was totally
dependent on the contraposition equivalence rule. In other words, students
were expected to say that the proof was correct only if they believed that
the given implication statement and its contrapositive were equivalent. As-
suming that one accepts the contraposition equivalence rule, the statement
‘If x=y ⇒ x2=y2’ is taken to be a (correct) proof for the given statement
(that is, a convincing argument about the validity of the given statement),
because the truth of the proposition ‘If x=y ⇒ x2=y2’ is readily acceptable
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by anyone with basic mathematical preparation. The statement that was
to be proved, on the other hand, is by far less obvious – this less obvious
character is what makes the search for a proof meaningful. Finally, the
design of a proof totally dependent on the contraposition equivalence rule
helped control other factors that would probably emerge in a more lengthy
and complicated proof. Goetting (1995) reports, for example, that some
students rejected a proof by contradiction because they were unable to
follow an intermediate algebraic step.
The second item (Q2) included two statements and a conclusion. The
subjects were asked to evaluate the validity of the conclusion, given the
two statements, and explain their thinking. The conclusion was correct
(i.e., the right choice was ‘1’) and was based on the contraposition equi-
valence rule p⇒q ≡ ∼q⇒∼p. The third item (Q3) had the same structure
as the previous one. This time, however, the conclusion was wrong (i.e.,
the right answer was ‘2’) and was based on the wrong equivalence p⇒q
≡ ∼p⇒∼q. The word ‘definitely’ in the conclusions of the two questions
was making clear that the implications were intended to carry necessity.
As it is noted by Durand-Guerrier (2003), there is generally a confusion
shared among students and teachers on whether an implication in math-
ematics expresses necessity; the design of the tasks excluded this possible
confusion, the investigation of which was not central to our goals.
Q1 and Q2 were intended to test, respectively, students’ conceptualiz-
ation of contraposition in symbolic and verbal contexts. Q3 was included
for a more integrated investigation of students’ understanding of contra-
position, for it was testing students’ understanding of the other possible
‘logical equivalence’ that could be formed with the conditional sentence
p⇒q, and the propositions ∼p and ∼q when connected with the implic-
ation symbol; in this sense, Q3 can also be considered as a task ‘about
contraposition’. The inclusion of Q3 in the test was motivated by research
findings indicating that students often believe that an implication statement
p⇒q is equivalent to its inverse (∼p⇒∼q) rather than to its contrapositive
(∼q⇒∼p) (Goetting, 1995; Knuth, 1999, 2002). Q3 provided, in addi-
tion, another opportunity to examine students’ performance in a ‘logical
equivalence’ placed in verbal context.
2.3. Interviews
The interviews were conducted with students whose responses to the test
items seemed to be of special interest to the research questions of the larger
study; in this sense, the 11 subjects selected for an interview constituted a
purposeful sample (Patton, 1990). Special interest was defined primarily
in terms of exploring further common student understandings, eliciting
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explanations to responses at which students omitted to provide one, and
clarifying infrequent responses. Student identification was possible, for
students were asked to write their names on the test – students responded
positively to this request with only very few exceptions. The interviews
lasted approximately 35 minutes each, were audio taped and fully tran-
scribed. They were also carried out in the presence of two interviewers (the
first two authors), who tried to supplement each other in taking notes and
asking questions that would elicit students’ understanding. In this report,
we draw on data relevant to the research questions of the present paper.
The interview segments from which we draw on in this paper were
intended to explore students’ understanding of contraposition – the dif-
ferent ways of thinking reflected in their written explanations in the test
items and the rationale that guided their responses to the multiple-choice
questions. In preparing for the interviews, the interviewers would note
aspects of students’ responses that were of special interest, as explained
previously. The interviewers worked collaboratively to prepare from two to
five questions each time, with relevant probes for use as necessary. Issues
of interest to our research questions that emerged from the discussion were
explored further; to preserve space for this kind of examination the inter-
views were given a semi-structured character (Merriam, 1988). A topic
that was pursued in almost all interviews, irrespective of students’ written
explanations, was associated with students’ understanding of the common
logical structure underlying Q1 and Q2 in the test – that is, the fact that
both problems were based on the same logical equivalence. In most of the
interviews, the discussion about students’ understanding of contraposition
equivalence rule started with a focus on a particular student response in
the test and probing the student to elaborate on that. For example, a typical
initial question was: “In question 2, you said that the conclusion is false.
Could you elaborate on how you thought about it?”
2.4. Analysis
The statistical analysis was performed by using the statistical package
SPSS. First, frequencies, percentages, and crosstabs tables of major by
Q1, Q2, and Q3 were obtained. The descriptive statistics gave a sense of
students’ understanding of contraposition, for they also provided inform-
ation about the distribution of wrong answers. Variables Q1 through Q3
were then recoded into PQ1 through PQ3, respectively, which represented
students’ performance in the three questions (dichotomous scale ‘0’ and
‘1’). t-tests were run to test the differences between students’ (EM and MM
considered together) performances in Q1 and Q2, Q1 and Q3, and Q2 and
Q3; these tests helped explore the relation between students’ performances
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in tasks about contraposition and the context in which this is placed. To
explore the role of students’ major, chi-square tests of Independence were
carried out to examine the relationship between major and performance
in each of the three questions. Furthermore, to examine the influence of
students’ major on the way their performance is associated to the context
wherein contraposition is placed t-tests were run to test the differences
between the performance of each of the EM and MM groups in Q1 and
Q2, Q1 and Q3, and Q2 and Q3.
The quantitative analysis was supplemented by the qualitative analysis
of the data gathered from the interview transcripts and the written explan-
ations given in the test. The classifications of responses were guided by
students’ choices in the multiple-choice questions. The selection of stu-
dent responses to be presented in the following section was guided by
the following two criteria: (a) illumination of students’ thinking, and (b)
illustration of the variety of students’ reasoning strategies.
3. RESULTS
The results are organized in three parts, each corresponding to one research
question. Even though the three research questions are closely related, we
keep this structure in presenting the results for the sake of clarity. In the last
section of the paper, the research questions are connected and discussed
integrally.
First, we report the percentages of students’ responses in each of the
multiple-choice questions, and we use students’ written and oral explana-
tions to further investigate their understanding of contraposition. To reduce
the likelihood of improper generalizations, percentages of types of student
explanations that exhibit particular characteristics are not reported. In the
other two parts, we present the results of statistical analysis on students’
performance in the three tasks.
3.1. Students’ understanding of contraposition
The percentages within major for each of the response options in Q1 are
presented in Table II. A general comment, which will be further invest-
igated in the next part, is that MM did considerably better than EM in
Q1. Almost two thirds (64.0%) of the MM gave a correct response to Q1,
as compared to only one fifth of the EM. Approximately half (47.1%) of
the EM considered the proposed proof by contraposition as false, whereas
only 28.0% of the MM expressed the same opinion. The rest of the EM
were divided almost equally among the options “The proof shows that
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TABLE II
Percentages for each response option in question 1 by major
Response in Question 1 Major
Educationa Mathematicsb
The proof is false 47.1 28.0
The proof shows that the statement is always truec 20.0 64.0
The proof shows that the statement is true in some cases 15.7 4.0
I have no opinion 17.1 4.0
Total 100.0 100.0
Note. The values represent percentages within major.
a n = 70. b n = 25. c Correct response for question 1.
the statement is true in some cases” and “I have no opinion” (15.7% and
17.1%, respectively). Each of these two options was selected by only one
MM (this corresponds to 4.0% of the MM participants).
From the explanations that EM gave in the interviews, it is clear that
one of the reasons that made them consider the contraposition proof as
wrong was that it was short. Below is an extract from the interview with
EM38 (‘I’ denotes the interviewers).
I: In the first question, you stated that the proposed proof was wrong.
Could you please explain your reasoning?
EM38: I said that it was wrong because of its appearance. This, at least,
doesn’t inspire me to say that the proof is correct. I believe that it
is too short to be a proof.
A number of EM rejected the proposed proof by disputing its generality
over the whole set of natural numbers.
EM36: I believe that the calculations in the proof are correct. However,
the proof does not convince us that the statement is valid in the
general case where x and y are natural numbers.
I: So, do you think that the proof is a right or a wrong one for the
given statement?
EM36: In my view. . . I think that it is not a correct proof.
Some students did not notice that x, y ∈ N and assumed that x, y ∈
Z; this often made them choose the option “The proof shows that the
statement is true in some cases”, as they believed that the statement failed
for pairs of opposite integers. However, even if x and y belonged to the set
of integers, the proof would still hold.
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EM18: The way the statement [in the proof] is presented, it is valid for
some numbers. . . for some values of x and y it is true and for some
other values it is not true. For example, we know that two num-
bers. . . which have equal square values. . . these numbers are equal.
However, it is possible for two numbers to have the same absolute
value, hence their square values are equal, but these numbers are
not equal. For example, x could be equal to –5 and y could be equal
to +5.
MM12: The proof is wrong because, even though there is no error in it, it
doesn’t show the required. In other words, the proof is correct, but
it doesn’t prove what it was supposed to prove.
I: Which case does the proof fail to examine?
MM12: The case of the negation. For example, when we have a number
that is negative with its opposite number. For instance, take –3
with +3.
Students’ confusion seems to originate from their failure to realize that
neither the statement nor its proof make use of the implication x2=y2 ⇒
x=y, which indeed requires the condition x, y ∈ N in order to be true
(given that we can only choose between the sets of natural numbers and
integers). This confusion may be associated with the belief that the correct
logical equivalence is p⇒q ≡ ∼p⇒∼q and not that of contraposition. It
is also worth noting that both EM18 and MM12 seem to readily accept the
statement that ‘If x=y ⇒ x2=y2’, which was given in the proposed proof;
this provides further support to the claim that the reason for which these
students did not accept that the proof was correct was that they did not
believe that the given implication statement and its contrapositive were
equivalent.
During the interviews, we pointed out to the students the given they
were ‘looking for’ (i.e., that x, y ∈ N). This information caused some of
them to revise their initial response (e.g., EM18); this, however, does not
necessarily imply that they also understood the logic of the proof.
I: If you look back at the statement, however, both x and y are natural
numbers. As a result, they can only be positive.
EM18: Oh. . . they are both positive. Yes, I think that, given that both x
and y are positive, the statement is complete. In other words, the
statement always holds. It always holds, because it is not possible
now to have two equal numbers with different square values.
I: Do you think that the proposed proof proves the statement?
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EM18: The given proof should be part of a more general proof that would
include ‘analysis’ and ‘synthesis’. What I mean is that here we
proceed backwards. We conduct an examination and say that x=y
implies. . . x2=y2. The proof should then use this and say that, if
x2 =y2 then x =y, since both x and y are natural numbers.
EM18 seems to believe that the proof under examination should be part
of a more detailed proof, as the additional step he suggests is, basically, a
remark that the required has been shown.
Contrary to what happened with EM18, MM12 insisted on his original
view that the proof is false even after we pointed out to him the unnoticed
given.
I: . . . Yes, but the statement says that both x and y are natural
numbers.
MM12: I probably didn’t notice that.
I: Does this change anything to you?
MM12: I continue to believe that the proof is wrong, because I think
that it proves the other direction, the converse of the required.
Because. . . it proves that if x =y then x2 =y2. Basically, using the
method of contradiction it proves the converse. I continue to
believe that it doesn’t prove what it was supposed to prove.
The above extract suggests that MM12 does not accept the validity of
the contraposition equivalence rule. The student claims that the sugges-
ted proof shows that ‘if x=y then x2 =y2’ and not the required, that is, ‘if
x2 =y2 then x=y’. Given the connection that the student makes between the
statement used in the proof (i.e., ‘if x=y then x2=y2’) and the proposition
‘if x=y then x2 =y2’, he seems to think that the former is equivalent to the
latter. This provides further support to the claim that the student believes
that the following ‘logical equivalence’ is true: p⇒q ≡ ∼p⇒∼q. Finally,
the student’s response also reveals confusion about proof by contradiction.
Table III shows the percentages per major for each of the response
options in Questions 2 and 3. A general comment from the table is that the
MM did better than the EM in Q2, while the reverse happened in Q3 (these
observations are investigated statistically in the following part). As regards
the EM, 67.1% answered correctly that the conclusion in Q2 was correct,
22.9% considered it incorrect, and the rest (10.0%) replied that they did
not have enough information to decide. The corresponding percentages for
the MM in this question were 76.0%, 20.0%, and 4.0%. In Q3, 75.7% of
the EM considered correctly the conclusion as false, 15.7% regarded it
as true, and the remaining 8.6% said that they could not decide from the
given clues. The percentages for the MM were 60.0%, 4.0%, and 36.0%,
respectively.
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TABLE III
Percentages for each response option in questions 2 and 3 by major
Responses Question 2 Question 3
Educationa Mathematicsb Educationa Mathematicsb
The conclusion is correctc 67.1 76.0 15.7 4.0
The conclusion is wrongd 22.9 20.0 75.7 60.0
I do not have enough clues
to decide 10.0 4.0 8.6 36.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note. The values represent percentages within major.
a n = 70. b n = 25. c Correct response for question 2. d Correct response for question 3.
The students that considered the conclusion of Q2 as correct justified
their decisions in many ways. Some of these justifications were clearly
making use of the contraposition equivalence rule (e.g., EM12).
EM12: A (pneumonia) ⇒ B (high fever) ≡ not B ⇒ not A.
Some other responses could be considered more or less as repetitions of the
givens and the conclusion (e.g., EM60, EM24); from this kind of responses
it is hard to say whether the students really believed in the validity of the
contraposition equivalence rule.
EM60: It [i.e., the conclusion in Q2] is correct. If he suffers from pneu-
monia, then he certainly has fever. If he doesn’t have fever, then he
certainly doesn’t suffer from pneumonia.
EM24: High fever is a definite symptom of pneumonia. If he has no fever,
the disease cannot be pneumonia.
Other students used logical thinking and concepts of set theory (Venn Dia-
grams) to justify their responses (e.g., EM49, MM2); these justifications
are more revealing of the students’ way of thinking.
EM49: Since high fever (A) is a certain consequence of pneumonia (B),
then B is a subset of A. Hence, if A doesn’t hold, B doesn’t hold
either. Therefore, the conclusion is correct.
MM2: It is correct.
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Finally, MM1 used reasoning by contradiction to justify the validity of the
given conclusion. This explanation illustrates the relation between proof
by contradiction and contraposition equivalence rule.
MM1: It is true. It’s an application of proof by contradiction. If he
suffered from pneumonia, he would have high fever. Contradic-
tion, since he doesn’t have high fever.
Some students argued that the conclusion was incorrect (e.g., EM2,
EM58, MM7) or that they did not have enough clues to decide (e.g., EM8),
because they did not accept the equivalence of the two conditional sen-
tences. It is worth noting that one of the students (EM2) who considered
the conclusion incorrect referred explicitly to contraposition.
EM2: ‘Costas suffers from pneumonia’ is a statement that implies the
statement ‘He has high fever’. The conclusion, however, is wrong
because this doesn’t necessarily mean that the contrapositive holds
too.
EM58: It is wrong. We know that ‘If a, then b’. Now we are given ‘not b’.
This does not imply ‘not a’.
MM7: Pneumonia ⇒ High fever. Doesn’t suffer from pneumonia \⇐ He
doesn’t have high fever.
EM8: I cannot decide. It does not necessarily mean that if B doesn’t hold,
then A doesn’t hold either.
Some students (e.g., EM13, EM50) considered the conclusion incor-
rect, because it was not compatible with their real-life knowledge and
experience about pneumonia and fever. These students did not manage to
decontextualize the statements and assess the necessity of the conclusion
in purely logical terms.
EM13: Perhaps fever is not the only symptom. Therefore, the conclusion
is wrong.
EM50: The conclusion is false. Perhaps Costas ‘lost’ his voice because
of pneumonia or inflammation. Fever is not the only symptom of
pneumonia.
However, the reasoning behind these statements is incorrect; the conclu-
sion would hold even in the case that high fever were not the only symptom
of pneumonia.
In the interviews, we tried to explore whether the students could see the
connection between Q1 and Q2. In the cases where the subjects accepted
the validity of the contraposition equivalence rule only in the verbal con-
text of Q2, we tried to see whether the discussion would help them also
accept its validity in the symbolic context of Q1. The following extract
from the interview with EM36 is such an example.
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I: Can you go back now and read again question 2, in order to see
whether there is any resemblance between that problem and the
proof we have just talked about in question 1?
EM36: If we assign mathematical symbols to the two statements [of Q2],
then they [i.e., Q1 and Q2] look similar. Even though in question
2 I gave a correct response and accepted. . . the solution as true, in
question 1 I didn’t make something similar.
I: Why do you think that happened?
EM36: Because it’s a more abstract concept and I didn’t have any concrete
point of reference.
EM36 attributes his inconsistency in the way he responded to the two
questions to the concreteness of the verbal context as opposed to the ab-
stractness of the symbolic notation. Along similar lines EM38 talks about
the ‘clarity’ of the verbal context:
EM38: Perhaps here [i.e., Q2] I wrote this [i.e., the correct answer] be-
cause of the clearer character of the task. In my view, the verbal
context is clearer.
I: Are you saying that you can see a resemblance between these
statements [i.e., the statements in Q2] and the proof in question
1?
EM38: Yes. We have again the contrapositive. One assumes the negation
of the second and concludes with the negation of the first. I believe
that the proof in question 1 is also correct.
It is worth noting that both EM36 and EM38, after noticing the inconsist-
ency in their responses to Q1 and Q2, supposed that the correct choice was
the one given to the question placed in the verbal context (namely, Q2)
and started looking for reasons that caused their incorrect response to the
symbolic task (namely, Q1).
Several students correctly revised their thinking about the validity of
the proof in Q1 after the cognitive conflict they experienced with the real-
ization that they responded differently to two isomorphic problems. Of
course, there were also some students who had difficulty understanding the
same logical structure of the verbal and the symbolic tasks. For instance,
MM12 was unwilling to accept the correctness of the proof in Q1, even
after he had the chance to reconsider, during the interview, his original
response to Q2 and seemed to have accepted the correctness of the conclu-
sion.
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MM12: Looking again at the conclusion [of Q2], I now believe that it is
true because high fever is necessary condition for Costas to have
pneumonia.
I: Can you see any resemblance between this conclusion and the
proof in question 1?
MM12: I believe that the correct response would be to say that ‘x ⇒ y’ is
equivalent to ‘not x ⇒ not y’ and not that it implies the other, i.e.,
that ‘not y ⇒ not x’.
Our discussion with MM19 was along the same lines as that with MM12.
MM19 accepted originally the validity of the conclusion in Q2, but rejected
the proof in Q1 because of his belief that the contraposition equivalence
rule was wrong. Contrary to what happened with MM12, though, MM19
used this belief to (implicitly) revise his response to Q2 saying that the
conclusion “Costas definitely does not suffer from pneumonia” does not
follow from the two statements.
MM19: The proof in question 1 says that, ‘if x=y then x2=y2’. It doesn’t
say that, ‘if x =y then x2 =y2’. We only have implication here and
not equivalence. This proof is incomplete. It’s wrong.
I: Okay. In question 2 you said that the conclusion is correct. Sup-
pose we see now question 2 in terms of ‘implications’ [expressed
in symbolic notation]. Can you see any resemblance between
question 2 and the proof in question 1 we discussed earlier?
MM19: If we set p to mean ‘Costas suffers from pneumonia’ and q to mean
‘Costas has high fever’, the statement means that ‘if p then q’.
‘Costas doesn’t have high fever’ is the negation of q. The negation
of q doesn’t imply the negation of p.
The extracts from the interviews with both MM12 and MM19 reveal
that some students reject the contraposition equivalence rule because they
believe that the correct equivalence relating the conditional sentence p⇒q
with the propositions ∼p and ∼q is p⇒q ≡ ∼p⇒∼q. For more integ-
rated investigation of students’ understanding, we next examine students’
responses to Q3.
Below, we present some examples of written responses from students
who stated that the conclusion of Q3 was wrong.
E61: It is wrong: ∼p⇒∼q /≡ p⇒q.
MM3: It is incorrect.
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EM20: It is false. The statement says that without fuel the car won’t move,
and not that when the car has fuel (and only then) will it definitely
move.
EM24: It is false. The statements don’t imply that the only condition for
the car to move is to have fuel.
EM55: It is false. Fuel is a basic (perhaps the most important) condition
for a car to move. It is not the only one, however. Therefore, it
doesn’t necessarily follow that the car can move just because it has
fuel. For instance, the car may have a mechanical problem.
It is plausible to say that EM55 rejects the conclusion on the basis of
everyday life experiences and not on logical rules of inference.
Several students who chose the option “I do not have enough clues
to decide” justified their responses by arguing that they could not make
a definite decision about the necessity of the conclusion in p⇒q given
that both ∼p⇒∼q and p hold. Several of them failed to recognize that this
conclusion was phrased (in Q3) as a logically necessary inference and was,
therefore, wrong.
EM58: I cannot decide, because the statement ‘if not a ⇒ not b’ does not
give us any information about the ‘validity of a’.
MM1: I cannot decide because we are not told what follows from the fact
that ‘the car has fuel’.
MM5: The first [statement in Q3] is an implication and not an equival-
ence, hence I do not have enough clues to decide.
The students who accepted the validity of the conclusion explained their
reasoning by relying basically on the wrong equivalence ∼p⇒∼q ≡ p⇒q.
E35: Without fuel, the car definitely cannot move. Hence, since it has
fuel, the conclusion is correct.
Others seemed to know what the correct logical operation should be, but
failed to realize that translating Q3 into symbolic notation would actually
yield a different and, at the same time, wrong logical equivalence. The
response of E12 is indicative.
E12: It is true: Not A → Not B ≡ B → A
As with the other questions, there were some students who based their
responses on their everyday experience (e.g., EM14, EM46, MM7).
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TABLE IV
Percentages of correct and incorrect responses to questions 1, 2, and 3 by major, and for
the total sample
Major Question 1 Question 2 Question 3
False Correct False Correct False Correct
Response Response Response Response Response Response
Educationa 80.0 20.0 32.9 67.1 24.3 75.7
Mathematicsb 36.0 64.0 24.0 76.0 40.0 60.0
Total Samplec 68.4 31.6 30.5 69.5 28.4 71.6
Note. The values represent percentages within major in each question.
a n = 70. b n = 25. c n = 95.
TABLE V
Comparisons of percentages of correct responses for the
total sample
Question
Question 1 2 3
1 – –6.30∗ –6.07∗
2 – –.35
3 –
Note. The values represent t-values in the two-tailed paired
samples tests for differences in percentages of correct
responses in every combination of 2 for the three questions.
n = 95, df = 94. ∗p<.001. The unmarked value was not
found to be statistically significant (p>.05).
E14: The car will move, but this is not for sure. Even though it has fuel,
there still may be a mechanical problem. The conclusion is only
partly true.
E46: It is true, but not definitely [true]. Something may happen and the
car may not move (for other reasons [not related to fuel]).
MM7: It is true given that there are no other problems or factors affecting
the movement of the car.
3.2. Relation between students’ performance and context
Table IV summarizes the percentages of correct and incorrect responses
to Questions 1, 2, and 3 by major as well as for the total sample. Table V
152 ANDREAS J. STYLIANIDES ET AL.
TABLE VI
Comparisons of percentages of correct responses for the two majors
Educationa Mathematicsb
Question 1 2 3 1 2 3
1 – –6.77∗ –7.70∗ – –1.14 .37
2 – –1.29 – 1.28
3 – –
Note. The values represent t-values in the two-tailed paired samples tests
for differences in percentages of correct responses in every combination of
2 for the three questions.
a n = 70, df = 69. b n = 25, df = 24. ∗p<.001. The unmarked values were
not found to be statistically significant (p>.05).
presents the results of t-tests that were carried out to investigate the dif-
ference between the performances in every combination of two questions
for the group of 95 participants as a whole. As is shown in this table,
the percentage of students who answered correctly Q1 was significantly
different from the corresponding percentages for both Q2 and Q3 (t(94)=–
6.30, p<.001, and t(94)=–6.07, p<.001, respectively). Taking into account
the actual percentages of correct responses to the three questions (31.6%,
69.5%, and 71.6% for Q1, Q2, and Q3, respectively; see Table IV), we can
conclude that students performed significantly better in the verbal context
(Q2 and Q3) than in the symbolic (Q1). There is no evidence to suggest
that students’ performance was different in the two verbal questions, Q2
and Q3 (t(94)=–.35, p=.73).
3.3. Relation between students’ major and performance in different
contexts
Chi-Square test of Independence showed that there is a relation between
performance in Q1 (PQ1) and the students’ major (Pearson χ2(1, N = 95) =
16.51, p < .001). Looking at how the percentages were distributed
(Table IV), we may conclude that MM are more likely than EM to do better
in Q1. Chi-Square tests of Independence revealed no significant relation
between PQ2 and PQ3, and students’ major (Pearson χ2 (1, N = 95) = .68,
p=.41, and Pearson χ2 (1, N = 95) = 2.24, p=.14, respectively).
Table VI summarizes the results of t-tests that were carried out to in-
vestigate the difference between the performances in every combination
of two questions for each of the two groups (EM and MM) separately.
As is shown in the table, the percentage of EM who answered correctly
Q1 was significantly different from the corresponding percentages of both
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Q2 and Q3 (t(69)=–6.77, p<.001 and t(69)=–7.70, p<.001, respectively).
Taking into account the actual percentages of correct responses in the three
questions (20.0%, 67.1%, and 75.7% for Q1, Q2, and Q3, respectively; see
Table IV), we can conclude that EM performed significantly better in the
verbal context (Q2 and Q3) than in the symbolic (Q1). There is no evidence
to suggest that the performance of EM was different in the two verbal
questions, Q2 and Q3 (t(69)=–1.29, p=.20). There is also no evidence
to suggest that MM performed differently in any of the combinations of
two questions in the test: Q1-Q2 (t(24)=–1.14, p=.27), Q1-Q3 (t(24)=.37,
p=.71), Q2-Q3 (t(24)=1.28, p=.21).
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The results suggest that students’ major (education/mathematics) does play
a role in students’ performance in contraposition placed in different con-
texts (symbolic/verbal). When the participants were considered as a whole,
there was evidence that their performance in contraposition was signific-
antly better in the verbal than in the symbolic context (31.6% and 69.5%,
respectively). Their performance in the two verbal tasks about contrapos-
ition was comparably equal (69.5% and 71.6%). These results could be
taken as evidence in favor of the claim that logical competence in the
symbolic reasoning domain is, in general, lower compared to that in other
reasoning domains, such as verbal (Morris, 2002). When the participants
were considered according to their majors, however, the picture was not the
same for both EM and MM. Only the performance of the EM was in com-
plete agreement with the general picture reported earlier; the performance
of the MM deviated from the above pattern as it presented only modest
variations between the two contexts. The latter remark suggests that MM
operate comparably the same in symbolic and verbal reasoning domains
related to contraposition. Furthermore, the fact that the two groups’ per-
formance showed different variations in the two contexts, points out a
merit for considering the two student populations separately. The find-
ing that the general picture of students’ performance agrees with that of
the education majors, when the two groups are considered separately, can
primarily be attributed to the considerably larger representation of EM in
the sample compared to the representation of MM (this, despite the fact
that the MM that participated in the study constituted the whole population
of the seniors of the Mathematics Department of the University of Cyprus
that specific academic year).
The analysis of the data showed that EM performed significantly better
in the verbal contexts of Q2 and Q3 – which examined, respectively, the
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equivalence (or not) of a logical implication, on the one hand, and its con-
trapositive or inverse, on the other – compared to their performance in the
symbolic context of Q1 – which examined the contraposition equivalence
rule in the context of a mathematical proof. In particular, the EM per-
formed comparably equal in the two verbal tasks (67.1% in Q2 and 75.7%
in Q3) and more than three times better than in the symbolic task (20.0%
in Q1). It is worth noting that one of the reasons that the EM did not accept
the validity of the contraposition proof in Q1 was that the suggested proof
was ‘short’. This proof characteristic made several EM consider the proof
as non-convincing and regard its argument as being superficial. The results
support the findings of other studies with students majoring in education.
Martin and Harel (1989) found that the judgments of a mathematical ar-
gument by many pre-service elementary school teachers were influenced
by its appearance in the proof context – what they called the ritualistic
aspects of proof – and not the correctness of the argument. Along similar
lines, Winicki-Landman (1998) reports that students majoring in education
were found to employ aesthetic criteria, such as length and explanatory
power, in evaluating the validity of a proof. We need to note, however,
that reliance on ritualistic aspects of a proof in judging its validity is not
a tendency exclusively associated with the mathematical behavior of edu-
cation majors; similar results are reported for other student populations as
well, such as high-school students (Vinner, 1983) and mathematics ma-
jors (Harel and Sowder, 1998). Harel and Sowder (1998), for example,
describe an episode in which a student in an elementary Linear Algebra
course, taken by sophomore mathematics majors, had doubts whether one
of his proofs was mathematically valid, because, as he noted, it did not
‘look like’ a proof. Furthermore, there is evidence that students employ
similar criteria while making mathematical decisions in other domains as
well, such as the domain of functions, graphs, and graphing. In particular,
research has shown that students tend to connect points (regardless of the
appropriateness of this action) because it ‘looks better’ (Leinhardt et al.,
1990).
The analysis of the data collected from the MM students showed that,
compared to their performance in the task placed in symbolic context
(Q1), they did better in the verbal context of Q2 and slightly worse in
that of Q3; the percentages, however, were close enough to each other
(64.0%, 76.0%, and 60.0%, respectively) so that no statistically signific-
ant differences were found. A plausible interpretation would be that MM
appear to be equally competent in reasoning about contraposition in sym-
bolic and verbal contexts. Even though the results provide some support
to this interpretation, the small number of MM that participated in this
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study do not allow for a thorough investigation of this issue. The qualit-
ative analysis of our data revealed that one of the reasons that led MM
to reject the contraposition proof was the belief that the correct logical
equivalence was p⇒q ≡ ∼p⇒∼q and not that of contraposition. This
finding is consistent with Knuth’s (2002) findings from a study with 16
secondary school mathematics teachers all of whom had undergraduate
degrees in mathematics or in related fields. Specifically, ten of the parti-
cipants in Knuth’s study accepted as proof a mathematical argument that
was based on the same invalid logical equivalence. In future investigations,
larger numbers of participants majoring in mathematics are necessary to
address the methodological constraints imposed by the small sample sizes
in both our and Knuth’s study. We also suggest that future studies of this
kind include both symbolic and verbal tasks for the invalid logical equi-
valence p⇒q ≡ ∼p⇒∼q. Had we asked the participants to also react to
the ‘proof’ given below for the statement of Q1, we would be in a better
position to investigate students’ understanding of contraposition, and the
role of the context (wherein logical equivalences are placed) in students’
performance:
Statement: If x2 =y2 then x =y (where x, y ∈ N)
Proof: If x2=y2⇒ x=y. Hence, the statement is true.
A number of students judged the validity of the conclusions in the
verbal tasks (Q2 and Q3) not by considering whether the given statements
logically necessitate the conclusions, but by introducing personal know-
ledge about the relations between pneumonia and high fever, in one of the
tasks (Q2), and fuel and car movement, in the other (Q3). This finding
is compatible with earlier observations that adult reasoners’ application of
knowledge about judgments of necessity is affected by personal knowledge
or beliefs about the argument content (Morris, 2002). The meaningful6
words and relations used in the verbal tasks allowed students to draw
from their experiences and personal knowledge in judging the validity
of the suggested statement-conclusion relations; the prior knowledge and
experiences sometimes proved to be helpful and others misleading. An
interesting investigation would be to also give students statements with
non-meaningful words and see how this affects their performance. The
results of previous research (O’Brien, 1972) suggest that, in the case of
tasks with non-meaningful words, students’ performance is likely to de-
crease. Research, however, provides a weak basis on which to formulate
hypotheses about the relation between students’ performance in tasks with
non-meaningful words and symbolic tasks that investigate the same lo-
gical principles. Also, research provides little information about possible
differences in the performances of students majoring in different fields of
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study on such tasks. Although students’ performance in tasks with non-
meaningful words has a research interest (in terms of exploring further
students’ logical competence), the examination of their performance in
meaningful verbal contexts appears to be pedagogically more important
(Epp, 1998).
The fact that MM performed significantly better than EM in the sym-
bolic task is not surprising. The frequency with which contraposition equi-
valence rule is encountered in the mathematics program of study is quite
high; contraposition equivalence rule is frequently used in proving univer-
sal conditionals of the form ∀ x ∈ D, if P(x) then Q(x), and the rationale that
lies behind it also relates to those of other proof methods repeatedly en-
countered in the mathematics collegiate curriculum, namely, proof by con-
tradiction and proof by counterexample. Although EM performed poorly
in the symbolic task (Q1), they performed comparably equal with MM in
the questions placed in verbal context (Q2 and Q3) and they even out-
performed MM in one of them (Q3). It is plausible to argue that this
dramatic increase in the performance of the EM in the verbal tasks reflects
the emphasis of the education program of study, wherein, even though
symbolic manipulations are not ignored, the focus is more on verbal, real-
life problems. Problems that involve use of symbolic notation, primarily
found in the probability and the two foundations courses of the mathemat-
ics curriculum of the Department of Education (cf. section 2.1), are often
connected to verbal situations in an attempt to make them more relevant to
the work of teaching elementary mathematics. The last in the sequence of
four courses relevant to mathematics taken by EM, namely, the course on
the teaching and learning of mathematics, focuses on problems that require
more verbal syllogistic reasoning and fewer justifications that are strictly
based on mathematical symbolism. The relatively uniform performance of
the MM in the symbolic and verbal problems is harder to explain with ref-
erence to the presumed emphasis of the mathematics collegiate curriculum
on symbolic tasks. One plausible explanation might be that MM were able
to apply their symbolic knowledge of contraposition in the verbal tasks as
well; this explanation is grounded on the assumption that MM intentionally
tried and were successful in transferring their symbolic knowledge to the
verbal tasks. This interpretation is supported by the results that showed that
the reasons for which MM rejected Q2 were very similar to those for which
they rejected Q1; these reasons were centered on the belief that an implic-
ation statement is equivalent to its inverse rather than to its contrapositive.
The validity of this interpretation is, however, questioned if one considers
the interview with MM12 that revealed his difficulties to relate problems
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Q1 and Q2. These issues can only be addressed with future research that
will include more interviews with MM participants.
The results of this study call for both major- and context- specific con-
siderations of students’ understanding of, and performance in, logical prin-
ciples. The students’ major and the context wherein a task is placed are
not the only parameters that appear important to consider when report-
ing on students’ reasoning on logical principles. For instance, students’
mathematical competence and views of proof were also found to relate to
their understanding of proof (Healy and Hoyles, 2000). On the other hand,
there is evidence that the mathematical content (arithmetical/geometrical)
of the problems has little influence on students’ mathematical proof capa-
city (Recio and Godino, 2001). We need, however, to be cautious when
drawing conclusions about the relevant importance of factors that have
been examined in different studies, given the diversity in populations and
methodological practices. It is often the case that factors examined in some
studies are not considered in others. Take, for example, the study by Recio
and Godino (2001). In this study, one of the samples consisted of 429 fresh-
men that took a mathematics subject in different faculties and polytechnic
schools. Even though students’ proof schemes appeared to be relatively
independent from the mathematical content (arithmetical/geometrical) of
the problems posed, the findings of the present study suggest that the same
picture might have not been obtained had the students been considered
according to their majors. Because Recio and Godino’s sample consisted
of freshmen at the beginning of their studies, students’ major would pre-
sumably reflect the emphases of the high-school mathematics curricula
that prepared students for entering the different faculties and polytech-
nic schools, rather than the emphases of the collegiate curricula of these
faculties and schools. Similar reasoning to the above could be applied
to suggest that, because in our study the mathematical proof presented
in Q1 had an arithmetical content (in Recio and Godino’s terms), it is
uncertain whether the same results would be obtained had the content been
geometrical.
Furthermore, it is important to recognize that the mathematical prepar-
ation received by the students that participated in our study may differ
from the one received by students majoring in the same fields but in other
countries; this may be particularly true about the mathematical preparation
of education majors. This remark introduces another factor, namely, the
cultural environment in which the study is conducted; this factor might be
important to consider, for it has been found to play a role in other domains,
such as the one of solving arithmetic problems. Specifically, Brazilian stu-
dents were found to be more successful when solving arithmetic problems
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in word context than when solving equivalent but purely symbolic prob-
lems (Carraher et al., 1987). However, a study with U.S. children (Baranes
et al., 1989) that used the same experimental paradigm of the Brazilian
study by Carraher et al. (1987) did not replicate these results – “no effects
of context were found in either strategy use or success” (Baranes et al.,
1989, p. 287). The context was found to be important only when addi-
tional factors were also considered; for example, the numbers were found
to “interact with problem content in a way that may or may not facilitate
successful solution of the problem” (Baranes et al., 1989, p. 316).
The apparent complexity of the system of factors that influence stu-
dents’ understanding of logical principles gives rise to the following ques-
tion: To what extent should we consider different factors in examining
students’ conceptualizations of the structure of logical relations? We claim
that the level of specificity should depend on the extent to which distinctive
and meaningful patterns are obtained. This study suggests that students’
major as well as the context (verbal/symbolic) wherein a logical task is
placed are two factors to consider in conducting such investigations.
Besides the research implications, our study also suggests a useful ped-
agogical implication. The teaching of logical principles may vary with
student populations, especially when students are well advanced in their
program of studies. If, for example, students’ ability to reason about logical
principles is, or is assumed to be, higher in verbal than in symbolic contexts
(as it was the case with the EM in our study), then it is plausible to argue
that instruction should build on students’ strengths in the verbal reasoning
domain to help them develop their capacity to reason in structurally similar
symbolic domains.
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NOTES
1. When we talk about contraposition equivalence rule in symbolic context, we basically
refer to proof by contraposition.
2. Although there is relatively little mathematics education research in the area of formal
and pragmatic logic, there is a considerable number of studies in other fields, especially
in psychology, that concentrate on this area (see, e.g., Cheng et al., 1986; Girotto et
al., 1988; Johnson-Laird et al., 1972). Because of the different focuses of mathematics
education research and other kinds of research, we consider important to have more
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studies that look specifically to issues of teaching and learning of mathematics in the
area of formal and pragmatic logic.
3. Papanastasiou and Papanastasiou (1997) also compare the factors that have influenced
students at the Pennsylvania State University and at the University of Cyprus to major
in elementary education.
4. These courses cover material that include the number systems and their main char-
acteristics, Pythagorean theorem, Ptolemy’s theorem and the birth of trigonometry,
Pappus’s theorem, Fibonacci sequence, the solution of third- and fourth-degree equa-
tions, the development of differential and integral calculus, elements of non-Euclidean
geometries, acclimatization to algebra, elements of matrix algebra, Boolean algebra,
number theory, Cartesian products, binary relations, functions, logical propositions,
algebra propositions, logic gates, and logic circuits. For a more detailed description of
the two courses see Philippou and Christou (1998) or the following web page:
http://www.ucy.ac.cy/epa/coursesE/sthirdareaE/sthirdareae.html.
5. The original items were in Greek. The same holds for the students’ responses to be
presented in the next section.
6. In our sense, meaningful does not necessarily imply realistic.
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